	D STATES COURT OF APPEALS OR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER	
REPORTER AND MAY NOT E OR ANY OTHER COURT, BU' OR ANY OTHER COURT IN A	LL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS I MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
	nited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Courthouse, at Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the nd five.
PRESENT:	
HON. DENISE CO	GGI, wit Judges,
JAMES KVEDAR,	
Plaintiff-Appellee,	
v.	No. 04-6334-cv
FRANK GRIFFIN,	
Defendant-Appellant.	

^{*} The Honorable Denise Cote, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

For Plaintiff-Appellee:	JOHN R. WILLIAMS, New Haven, Conn.
For Defendant-Appellant:	GREGORY T. D'AURIA, Associate Attorney General, (Jane R. Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, <i>on the brief</i>), <i>for</i> Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut Attorney General, Hartford, Conn.
Appeal from a final decision of the United States I Connecticut (Joan G. Margolis, <i>M.J.</i>).	District Court for the District of
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORI DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is REV	VERSED.
	VERSED.
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DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is REY Defendant-Appellant Frank Griffin ("Griffin"), Co	mmanding Officer of the Bureau of CSP"), appeals from the district court's
Defendant-Appellant Frank Griffin ("Griffin"), Co Criminal Investigations in the Connecticut State Police ("Connecticut State Police")	mmanding Officer of the Bureau of CSP"), appeals from the district court's damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendant-Appellant Frank Griffin ("Griffin"), Co Criminal Investigations in the Connecticut State Police ("G denial of his motion for summary judgment on a claim for	mmanding Officer of the Bureau of CSP"), appeals from the district court's damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 P. Kvedar alleges that Griffin
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Because immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial, and thus is effectively lost if a case is allowed to proceed, the denial of qualified immunity is appealable, but only to the extent that

immunity.

1	the denial turns on a question of law. Mitchett v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 311, 330 (1983); Cowah v.	
2	Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 760-61 (2d Cir. 2003).	
3	We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts, the procedural history, and the issues or	
4	appeal.	
5	To state a valid equal protection "class of one" claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he or	
6	she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, and (2) that there is	
7	no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564	
8	(2000); DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704, 706 (2d Cir. 2003). After the district court denied	
9	Griffin's summary judgment motion, this Circuit clarified the standard for the "similarly	
10	situated" prong of equal protection "class of one" analysis. Neilson v. D'Angelis, 409 F.3d 100,	
11	105 (2d Cir. 2005). Under Neilson, it is clear that, as a matter of law, Kvedar's situation was	
12	insufficiently similar to his comparators' to support an equal protection "class of one" claim.	
13	The judgment of the district court is, therefore, REVERSED, and the district court is	
14	instructed to grant summary judgment to Griffin.	
15		
16	For the Court,	
17	ROSEANN B. MACKECHNIE,	
18	Clerk of Court	
19		
20	by:	
21	Oliva M. George, Deputy Clerk	